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Reading Texts, Reading Traditions:
African Masks and American Law
James Boyd White*
My subject in this Essay is the relation between a text or other
artifact and the tradition against which it acts. I want to begin by
borrowing from a book that seems to me to represent a model-not
the only model, of course, but a very good one-of a certain kind of
cultural investigation. The book is Inventing Masks by Z.S. Strother,
an art historian at Columbia University who specializes in African
art.1 Its material subject is a set of face masks made by the Central
Pende, an African people in what is now the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
I. THE MASKS OF THE PENDE
Even without a picture one can imagine what these masks look
like: carved from dark wood, with striking eye-holes and what seem
to be stylized features, painted in outline with white. I shall start by
thinking of the way we would respond to such a mask if we saw it in
a museum (where indeed many of them are collected). What would
we make of it? We might engage in a kind of formal analysis, in
terms of symmetry and asymmetry, or the balance of textures, say
wood and raffia, or of its colors. We could analyze its composition in
terms of contrast and harmony. All the while, almost of necessity,
the mask would for most of us have the character of the exotic, the
unknown. Perhaps like Freud, we would even think of it as primitive
art reflecting primitive impulses obscured in our more civilized
world.
We could of course compare it with other masks, from other parts
• Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, Adjunct Professor of Oassical
Studies, University of Michigan. An earlier version of this essay was given as a plenary talk at
the annual meeting of the Working Group on Law, Culture, and Humanities held at Wake
Forest Law School in March 1999.
1. Z.S. STROTHER, INVENTING MASKS: AGENCY AND HISTORY IN THE ART OF THE
CENTRAL PENDE (1998).
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of Africa, thus locating it in an array of possibilities. But we would
not understand the significance of the differences we observed; we
would not know what the mask before us meant.
What happens when such an object is contextualized more fully in
the culture and tradition of which it is a part? To do this is the aim of
Professor Strother's book, and it is fascinating and illuminating to
see what happens as a certain type of Pende mask is located first in
one aspect of its original context, then in another.
First, it turns out that the kind of mask in question is only used as
part of a dance performance, one engaged in exclusively by Pende
males, particularly young males eager for fame and reputation.
These dances are in fact the primary way in which men compete for
glory in this culture'- perhaps a little like football in America.
The dances are not just competitive, but take place at key
moments in community life, with deep significance as communityaffirming events. There is some sense that at these moments
ancestors are present too, not in the dancers themselves, but beside
them, or in the community as a whole? So let us say that these events
are in some sense of the term religious.
Professor Strother tells us in addition that the masks are actually
made not by the dancer, but by a sculptor at the dancer's order, and
this only after the dance has been completely choreographed,
costumes designed and made, drummers found, and other musical
accoutrements determined-bells on the ankles, for example, which
vary in timbre and significance and contribute much to the meaning
of the dance as a whole. The mask is made, that is, not as a freestanding art object, nor as a religious symbol or totem, but as part of
the complex competitive cultural activity of the dance. It is made to
fit the character the dancer has assumed, the kind of dance in which
he will engage, the costume and the drumming he has chosen-it is
the last thing made before the dance begins.'
How about the dances themselves? Many of them are versions of
earlier-established dances, with names, based upon the character the
dancer enacts, and his story. But even these dances are not rigidly
traditional: The dancers take considerable pains to innovate and
change, to make the dance better; this kind of transformation is in
fact part of the art in which the dancer is displaying his virtuosity.
Sometimes dancers will go even further, and invent completely new
dances, with new characters; if these are successful, they may repeat
them for years, or even decades, teaching them to younger men. If
2.
3.
4.

See id. at 14-15.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 30.
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these dances become part of the cultural repertoire, other dancers
will borrow them and make their own innovations, all of which are
subject to critical scrutiny by the community. To have invented such
a dance may be the chief glory of one's life.'
Like the dances, the costumes are designed out of an existing
repertoire-of hair styles, bracelets, foot rattles, hoops, and skinsand once more the performer will both replicate traditional patterns
and innovate upon them. The costume, like the dance, is thus a
cultural form to fit which the mask is designed.6
The masks themselves are to our eyes rather stylized, but in local
understanding full of significant variation. The significance derives
partly from a Pende aesthetic that seeks maximum articulation of
form and movement, partly from a Pende semiotics of mask features,
particularly with respect to gender. The Pende have, that is, an art of
reading faces both for character and gender, and the masks must
meet the criteria of that art.
This entire cultural complex, of which I am giving only the barest
sketch, is the context for which the masks are made and designed;
their meaning lies in the way in which they fit with and add to the
type of dance, the character and his story, the music, the costume,
the movements, and so forth, at once drawing their significance from
their context and acting on that context, to give it new resonance and
implication.
Finally, and briefly: Only when the mask has thus been seen as
part of a complex genre or cultural form, at once traditional and
innovative, can one begin to ask questions, as Professor Strother
does, about the history of that form, including the history of the
relation between innovation and tradition. She pursues this question
in relation to the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial stages of
Pende history. Is the remarkable degree of innovation she discovers
a relatively new phenomenon, or does it have its roots in the
"traditional" Pende world that existed before the arrival of the
French and Belgians? How were the forms of dance and mask used
to respond, first to the fact of colonialism, and then to
independence? To what extent, for example, were Europeans
mocked and ridiculed in the dances? How has the form changed in
the post-colonial condition?7 These are questions that interest
Professor Strother; for our purposes it is important that she is able to
pursue them only when she has located the mask as part of a
complex cultural form and practice.
5.
6.
7.

See id. at 22-43.
See id. at 45-71.
See id. at 229-63.
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This is an incomplete sketch of a long and beautifully argued book,
but I think that it may stand as one representation of the complex
relation that exists between a cultural object and its context, or what
might be called "text" and "tradition." One could read this story,
that is, as illustrating the way in which meaning can be seen to
consist in the relation between text and context, as a figure is seen
against a ground. What we call "tradition" is the cultural dimension
of context: the set of expectations that people bring to a text or other
significant object-the prior texts against which it works-which in

this sense contribute to its meaning
But it is not only that tradition gives meaning to the text; the text
gives meaning to the tradition, by confirming or upsetting it, or
transforming it. For the text invokes as important or authoritative
certain parts of the ground against which it figures, and reduces or
erases others.
The relation between text and tradition is thus dynamic and
interactive, full of movement, actual or potential; and it is in this
movement that much of the life both of the text and of the tradition
can be found. The meaning of a text is thus not simply "in" the text,
waiting to be apprehended, but lies in the activity of reading and
understanding both text and context, an activity that the text itself
stimulates; and this process is not reducible to interpretation in the
usual sense, but is itself a kind of text-making, with all that this
phrase implies- a gesture, if you will, in response to a gesture.
Notice that there are at least these two perspectives from which to
look at this material: first, that of the viewer, for whom the layers of
context define the tradition against which the mask is made, enabling
him or her to see with greater-but never complete -precision

and

understanding what it means; and second, that of the performer, for
whom the elements of the tradition I have described-the
expectations of his audience-act as simultaneous constraints and
enablements, the condition of his art, upon which his performance
will be made.
II. THE POETRY OF EMILY DICKINSON
As a way of focusing attention upon the individual artistic
component of a cultural performance, let me turn from the masks, of
which I know only what I am told by Professor Strother, to a more

familiar instance of cultural action, taken from the Western literary
tradition.9
8. I owe the phrase "prior texts" to Alton L. Becker. See ALTON L. BECKER, BEYOND
TRANSLATION: TOWARD A MODERN PHILOLOGY, especially at 188-93,286-90, 413-16 (1995).

9. The portion of this Essay dealing with the poetry of Emily Dickinson and a brief section
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Emily Dickinson begins one of her most famous poems this way:
Because I could not stop for DeathHe kindly stopped for meThe Carriage held but just Ourselves And Immortality."0
To begin to understand this fragment, like the mask, we would need
to know something of the cultural process of which it was a part. In
this case we would especially want to learn about the expectations
that governed the writing of poetry in New England in the midnineteenth century, particularly the writing of women-which was
supposed to consist of sentimental disquisitions upon a certain set of
topics, including Death and Nature, cast in verse of mind-numbing
regularity both in meter and rhyme." This set of expectations- this
tradition -constituted a force that Dickinson in some ways resisted,
in others followed. It helps explain, for example, why she writes in
this poem about death; why she uses the hyper-regular and
sentimental verse-forms of the Congregational hymnals; why she
refuses to rhyme in conventional ways, or when she does so, as here,
why the rhyming has an exaggerated quality. She makes the
conventions of her tradition a part of her subject and the object of
her criticism.
In the course of this poem, for example, Dickinson moves from the
relatively comfortable imagery of the stanza I quoted, in which
Death is a kindly gentleman, neutralized by "Immortality" -in a way
that makes it look as though she may be trying to be consistent with
the conventions of her time-to an ending very different in feeling,
when time stopped cold at the moment that she realized that "the
Horses' Heads / Were toward Eternity":
Because I could not stop for DeathHe kindly stopped for meThe Carriage held but just OurselvesAnd Immortality.
We slowly drove-He knew no haste
And I had put away

of the portion dealing with Brown v. Board of Education are taken from my recent book,
FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION (1999),

reprinted here with the kind permission of the University of Michigan Press.
10. Because I could not stop for Death, Poem 479 in 1 THE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON
(Ralph W. Franklin ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, Varorium ed. 1998), at 492.
11.

See generally CHERYL WALKER, THE NIGHTINGALE'S BURDEN: WOMEN POETS AND

AMERICAN CULTURE BEFORE 1900 (1982). For further discussion of Dickinson from this
perspective,

see

JAMES

BOYD

WHITE,

ACTS

LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS 224-71 (1994).

OF HOPE:

CREATING

AUTHORITY

IN

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 12:117

My labor and my leisure too,
For His CivilityWe passed the
At Recess-in
We passed the
We passed the

School, where Children strove
the RingFields of Gazing GrainSetting Sun-

Or rather-He passed UsThe Dews drew quivering and ChillFor only Gossamer, my GownMy Tippet-only TulleWe paused before a House that seemed
A Swelling of the GroundThe Roof was scarcely visibleThe Cornice-in the GroundSince then -'tis Centuries-and yet
Feels shorter than the Day
I first surmised the Horses' Heads
Were toward EternityThe effect of the poem is to transform the comfortable idea of
"Immortality" into the bleak and frightening "Eternity."
Of course our questioning could go on much longer, to include, for
example, the conditions of production: For whom and under what
conditions were these poems made? In what form were they given
physical embodiment? How do they relate to the conditions of an
unmarried woman in nineteenth-century Amherst, or to one who
was a child of her particular family? And so on. As with the masks, it
is important to recognize that the process would never be final or
complete, the meaning never perfectly retrieved. Claims of meaning
are thus exactly that, claims-always tentative, never perfectly
resolved.
III. AMERICAN LAW
To turn now to the law, I want to bring before you two items, again
very briefly.
A.
First, consider the following rather inelegant sentence-the
"holding" of Brandenburgv. Ohio-and think about what it means:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
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to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
As lawyers we know that the meaning of this sentence is not to be
found simply in its words, nor in their further formal definition, nor
in their restatement into other terms. Like the mask and the poem,
this sentence works out of and against a tradition, and it is only in its
relation to that tradition that its meaning can be found-and then
imperfectly at best.
In this case the tradition consists mainly, though not exclusively, of
a set of Supreme Court and other cases, the most famous of which
are probably Justice Brandeis's great opinion in Whitney v.
California,3 the Holmes-Brandeis dissents in Gitlow v. New York 4
and Abrams v. United States,5 and the first struggles with the
meaning of the First Amendment in the Schenck 6 and Masses7 cases.
Some of this language is very grand indeed. When we use the
language from Brandenburgwe refer not only to that particular case,
decided in 1969, but to the entire past against which it is a
performance-including not only the famous cases just mentioned,
but less famous ones as well, and to arguments advanced elsewhere
in the culture about the proper meaning of freedom of speech.
Judges of course do this too, and when they ask us questions about
8
Brandenburg, or any other case-Miranda,"
say-we had better
know that they are asking not just about the words of that text, but
its relation to a tradition-a tradition that is both imperfectly
knowable and in principle contested.
This helps explain too why we teach law as we do, not as a string of
rules or holdings, not as a Gilbert's Outline, but as an evolving
tradition: We know that the meaning of the legal text is not "in" the
text, or in a restatement of it, but in the relation between the text
and its contexts, in its performance against a background.
B.
I just said that the tradition was in principle contested, and it is
that point I wish to pursue in connection with my second example,
which consists of this famous language from Brown v. Board of
Education:
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Like the mask-and like the poem-this is an artifact made by

others, in other cultural circumstances, and the lawyer's crucial
question is what it means, or what it should be said to mean. And
like the other items, this one is a fragment. Our first effort will
accordingly be to locate this piece in the context defined by the
larger text-or series of texts-of which it is a part.

This must be done at several levels: that of the opinion itselfWhat is this talk about education? Does the Court really mean that
segregation in public drinking fountains or rest rooms would be
acceptable?-and also that of the larger legal process of which the
opinion is a part, including: litigation strategies; earlier cases such as
2 the language
Plessy v. Ferguson" and Sweatt v. Painter;
of the

Fourteenth Amendment itself; the debates about its adoption; the
history giving rise to it; debates of the time about states' rights, about
the evils of segregation; and so forth. Like the mask and the poem,
the opinion can only be read as a response to its pre-existing world,
against which it is a performance and to which it is shaped-as the
mask is shaped to the dance and the costume, and to the larger
tradition in which it occurs. This means, in turn, that the meaning of
the opinion is, despite appearances, not essentially propositional but
experiential in kind. It is performance against a background, and as
lawyers we know that understanding it requires an attunement to
that background.
The difficulties of reading the case in its original context are
greatly increased when we try to bring the case into the present, and
thus into a world different not only from that of the case itself but
also from any that was then imagined. What is Brown to mean
today? The promise it held out, of an integrated society within a
single generation and an end to racial hatred and contempt, can now
be seen as a rather hollow one. Of course many African-American
students do attend integrated schools and colleges, but it cannot be
denied that a great many schools are effectively segregated, though
not in the first instance by law but by residential patterns.
19.
20.
21.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1986).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Furthermore, some African-Americans want to attend schools that
will focus explicitly upon their own culture. This kind of proposed
self-segregation on the grounds of better education greatly
complicates the basic premise of Brown, that racial integration is an
inherently good thing, especially for the excluded minority.
The particular question of present meaning that has the most bite
at the moment is that of affirmative action: Is the promise of Brown
fulfilled merely by forbidding the state to segregate by law, or does it
require-or at least permit- affirmative state action to end the
patterns of racial dominance and abuse that have characterized
American society nearly from the beginning? Or, on the other hand,
does Brown's hostility toward racial classification support the view
that the state should be prohibited from drawing racial lines, even
those that benefit the minority?
Here I want to make an extremely sketchy suggestion, but one that
will I think connect back to the mask and the poem, namely that in
deciding now what Brown should mean we are not just interpreters
but engaged, like dancers and poets, in our own performances of
meaning, our own action against a cultural context or tradition, and
that it is open to us, like dancers and poets, to reimagine, to
reinterpret, that tradition itself.
What might that mean in this case? One might take as a starting
point the Court's view in the Slaughterhouse Cases,22 otherwise
objectionable though that case may be, that the Fourteenth
Amendment should not be regarded as authorizing a general power
of judicial review of the reasonableness and propriety of state
legislation, but as a text aimed at a particular problem of enormous
significance, namely the consequences of our infamous system of
racial slavery, just brought to an end by the Civil War. What would it
mean to think of the Fourteenth Amendment, or at least its Equal
Protection Clause, in such a way?
At a general level, this would be a way of imagining the
Fourteenth Amendment not as an abstract statement of general
principles but as constitutional action aimed at a particular social and
moral problem - in common law terms, a "mischief" - all on the view
that this problem should define the scope and meaning of provisions
in question. It would thus put into question one of the deepest, and
in many respects most valuable, assumptions that has governed the
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely that it should be
read in the spirit of the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of
Independence as a text that seeks to declare universal rights in a

22.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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universal language, as part of a law that is seen as aspiring above all
to neutrality and universality.
What would this mean in practical terms? If the point of the Civil
War amendments were seen to be the enfranchisement, in every
sense, of the African-American against whom the nation had
committed its historic crime--and not the articulation of a more
universal standard by which state action should be judged-it would
be hard to hold invalid any state action rationally designed to
address that problem by way of "affirmative action." Instead of
"strict scrutiny," applied as though the state were on the edge of
continuing to carry out its historic and noxious racist programs, there
would be considerable judicial deference to any sincere and rational
effort to redress or heal or recuperate the terrible consequences of
human slavery. This would be a different way of thinking about this
part of our Constitution, with different results in this important area.
If the views I sketch out were to be adopted, there would be
serious consequences for certain aspects of current equal protection
law that many of us hold dear and, even more importantly, for the
larger assumptions of universality and neutrality that often seem
essential to what we mean by law. I want to make clear that I am not
now arguing for such results,23 but simply wish to use this example to
suggest that the lawyer, like any other cultural actor -like the dancer
or poet-not only acts upon the basis afforded by his tradition but
can also, at times at least, urge the redefinition or reconstitution of
that tradition itself. And notice this: If I were to make this proposal
in a serious way we would then argue about it; our arguments would
in contrasting ways both build upon and redefine our tradition; and
the meaning of what was said on both sides could not be reduced to a
scheme of propositions, but, like the meaning of the mask or the
poem, would lie in the nature of the performance viewed against its
context.
IV. CLOSING
If the law is the kind of cultural action that I am claiming it is, what
flows from this fact? Here are some thoughts; I hope each of them
can be seen to derive much of its meaning from the context it has
been the aim of this Essay to create.
First, the law should be talked of as an art of performance, the
making of meaning against a context, or range of contexts; the
23. But if I may make just one remark: It was just these assumptions of universality and
neutrality that Herbert Wechsler invoked in his famous article, Toward Neutral Principlesof
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). As we all know, on such premises Wechsler
found Brown itself somewhat dubious.
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context should be seen as a necessary part of the meaning; and we
should recognize that one effect of the performance may be to
transform its own tradition.
Second, we should not expect that we could summarize the
meaning of such a performance-a case or argument, say-in a rule
or any other proposition, or that we could exhaustively state it even
in more complex and sophisticated ways. The claim of meaning is
always a claim, to be tested by other claims and responses; and the
incompleteness or imperfection of any one claim works as a kind of
openness to invention, to newness.
Third, to do law well we must learn it as a language and see its
performances as performances of language. It will not do to reduce it
to a string of propositions, or rules or holdings, nor, more broadly, to
reduce a particular professional performance to a label such as
"formalist" or "realist" either. Like the other cultural performances
that I have referred to, the law cannot be reduced to or replicated in
theory.
Fourth, while rules and holdings and logical claims are part of the
law, their meanings, as the Brandenburg example is meant to
suggest, are shaped by the culture within which and against which
they work.
Fifth, we should recognize that the legal performance, like the
dance, is profoundly communal in nature. It helps define both the
legal community and the community behind it, and the community
shapes the performance, through its responsive criticism.
Sixth-and perhaps most important-in our teaching of law we
should recognize, as we traditionally have, that we are teaching and
learning a complex set of practices and methods, ways of performing,
that cannot be reduced to other terms; and also that they have much
in common with other cultural forms that involve the making of a
text or other work against a tradition, which it both confirms and
transforms-much in common, that is, with the poetry of Emily
Dickinson and the masks of the Central Pende.

